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STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE
The Model Land Development Code' was promulgated by the Amer-
ican Law Institute as the paradigm for state legislatures to follow when
enacting land use laws for the future. 2 The Code is not intended to create
uniformity among state laws.3 Instead, states may use the articles of the
Code as models in drafting legislation that is more specifically suited to
their needs. 4 Article Nine, 5 which states rules of standing to participate
in land use disputes, poses a potential obstacle to would-be public interest
litigants. 6 This note will explore the effect of Article Nine on citizen plain-
tiffs and demonstrate how its ambiguous language, when combined with
the particularized laws of standing in individual states, can produce widely
divergent effects on the ability of public interest parties to gain access to
the courts.
I. PROCEDURAL OUTLINE OF THE MODEL LAND
DEVELOPMENT CODE
The Code creates two administrative land use control bodies.7 The
decisionmaking process is initiated by proceedings before the Land Devel-
opment Agency. This local body is empowered to approve "special de-
velopment permits."8 These permits allow alterations roughly analogous to
variances, special exceptions, and conditional rezoning. 9 The permits can
1 All references are to the ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Offi-
cial Draft, 1975) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. Some amendments to the Proposed
Official Draft were made at the American Law Institute's May 1975 convention, and
are not presently available in print.
2 See generally Fox, A Tentative Guide to the Anerican Law institute's Proposed
Model Land Development Code, 6 URBAN LAWYER 928, 929 (1974), where the
author states:
[T]he Code covers four substantive areas of land development control
law .... [Tlhese are: (1) the use of land, or zoning; (2) the division of
land into parcels, or subdivision; (3) replanning and development of
improperly or inadequately planned and used land, or urban redevelop-
ment; and (4) direct governmental intervention in the land market for
planning and development purposes, or eminent domain.
3 Id. at 949.
4 id.
;'CODE, supra note 1, § 9-101 et seq.
643 U.S.L.W. 2490 (May 27, 1975):
Dunham [the Chief Reporter] noted that the reporters intentionally did
not use the term "aggrieved party" nor did they adopt the broad citizen
suit provision found in some state environmental statutes authorizing
"any person" to initiate suit.
7 Fox, supra note 2, at 932, 941.
s CODE, supra note 1, §§ 2-201 to 2-212.
9 Fox, supra note 2, at 932.
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allow land uses as mundane as a special exception from a set-back require-
ment, or as far-reaching as rezoning for a regional shopping center. Agency
orders may be appealed directly. 10 However, if an order would impose
significant external costs on the region or state," it may first be appealed
to the State Land Adjudicatory Board12 by any party to the initial adminis-
trative proceedings. 13 The Board reviews the Agency's actions and issues
an order of its own. This order is also subject to judicial review.' 4 The
Adjudicatory Board's other function is to designate certain portions of
the state as "Areas of Critical State Concern" which are subject to special
development guidelines. 15 The development guidelines of the Land De-
velopment Agencies and other local governmental bodies located in these
areas must conform to those established by the Board.' 6 The Board's rules,
and the underlying statutory authority to make specific rules, can also be
attacked in the courts.'
7
Article Nine establishes standing and judicial review requirements for
appeals from actions of the Land Development Agency and the State Land
Adjudicatory Board.' The three sections defining who has standing to
initiate judicial proceedings differ in restrictiveness, with section 9-103,
governing appeals from orders of the Land Development Agency, being the
most restrictive section. 19 Section 9-104, pertaining to standing to chal-
lenge rules of the Adjudicatory Board, is the most liberal, 20 while section
9-105, dealing with court challenges to orders of the Adjudicatory Board,
falls somewhere in between.
2'
10 CODE, supra note I, § 9-103.
11 CODE, supra note 1, § 7-301. A decision made on the local level which imposes
burdens on persons living beyond the boundaries of the locality is said to have "ex-
ternal costs."
12 CODE, supra note 1, §§ 7-501 to 7-503.
13 CODE, supra note 1, § 2-304(5).
14 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-105.
15 CODE, supra note 1, § 7-201.
16 CODE, supra note 1, § 7-203.
17 CODE, supra note 1. § 9-104.
18 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-101 et seq.
19 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 469 states:
[I]t is the purpose of this Article to prevent a non-party [to the admini-
strative hearing] from starting an independent judicial proceeding to
challenge the validity of an administrative order.
The parties denominated by section 2-304(5) do not include public interest litigants.
The CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 470, states:
Other interested parties, such as civic organizations, or taxpayers who
do not meet the statutory requirements (e.g., own land near the land
in question, designated by ordinance or State Land Planning Agency
rule) can initiate review only by leave of court.
23 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-104, Official Note, at 473 states: "Standing to make
such attacks [on administrative rules] is broader than standing to review orders as set
forth in § 9-103."
21 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-105, Official Note, at 476-77 states rather cryptically:
Citizen suit provisions are found in much recently enacted state en-
vironmental legislation. The policy behind these broad grants of
standing is that activities of the state are of concern to the people of
the state as a whole, and not just to persons in isolated situations or
persons who suffer specific injury. Those statutes go even further than
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Hearings before the local Land Development Agency are the first phase
of the administrative process. An examination of section 9-103,22 govern-
ing standing to appeal orders of the Land Development Agency, reveals
that attaining party status at the initial adminstrative hearings is crucial
to obtaining access to judicial review. This section's limitations on stand-
ing are quite significant because, in the estimation of the draftsmen, 95
percent of all land use decisions will not involve external costs.2 3 The ad-
ministrative process in such decisions will then end with the Land De-
velopment Agency, since only decisions imposing external costs can be
reviewed by the State Land Adjudicatory Board.
Section 9-103 enumerates those persons entitled to initiate judicial
review of Land Development Agency decisions. Persons included are the
owner of the land involved, the local government, neighboring landowners,
and neighborhood organizations. -2 4 The narrowness of the foregoing classi-
this Section, allowing "any person" or "any citizen" to initiate suit,
presupposing representation of the public interest. Cf. Michigan En-
vironmental Protection Act of 1970, MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. §
691.1201 et seq. [(Supp. 1976)].
22 The full text of CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103 reads:
(1) A judicial proceeding concerning an order of a Land Development
Agency granting or denying development permission or an enforce-
ment order may be commenced only by:
(a) the owner of land involved in the order, or the applicant for
the development permit involved;
(b) the local government which created the Land Development
Agency; or
(c) a person to whom subsection (2), (3), (4), or (5) is applicable.
(2) If an order was required to be issued on the basis of a record
after an administrative hearing, a judicial proceeding may be com-
menced by a person who became a party to the administrative hearing
in the manner provided in § 2-305(5).
(3) If an order was not required to be issued on the basis for [sic] a
record after an administrative hearing, a judicial proceeding may be
commenced by:
(a) the owner of any land within [500] feet of the parcel on which
development is proposed; or
(b) any neighborhood organization qualified under § 2-307 by the
Land Development Agency if the boundaries of the organization in-
clude any part of the parcel on which development is proposed or of
any land within [500] feet of that parcel.
(4) Notwithstanding the limitations on persons entitled to com-
mence judicial proceedings in this section, a person who was improperly
denied an opportunity to participate in a required administrative
hearing may pursue a proceeding to review.
(5) The court may grant leave to pursue an action to review an order
to a person not entitled under the preceding sections who establishes
that he has a significant interest that has been affected by an order
and that the interest was not adequately represented in the administra-
tive proceeding.
(6) A judicial proceeding to determine the validity of an order of the
State Land Adjudicatory Board under Article 7 may be commenced
only by a person who was a party to the proceeding before the Board
or by the local government in which the land involved is located.
23 Fox, supra note 2, at 930: "The Reporters believe that as much as ninety-five
per cent of all land use decisions do not have regional or state-wide impact."
24 See note 22 supra. See also CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 465.
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fications is relieved by section 9-103(5), which allows a "person" with
a "significant interest" to obtain judicial review with leave of the court.
The draftsmen intended to restrict the use of section 9-103(5) primarily
to persons who were qualified to become parties to the original adminis-
trative proceeding of the local agency.2 5 Section 2-304(5) (d) raises to
party status "a person who satisfied the presiding officer that he has a
significant interest in the subject matter of the hearing." Thus, the mean-
ing of the term "significant interest" becomes crucial in determining the
ability of the public interest litigant to gain standing under this section.
The "significant interest" test has met with disapproval in the federal
courts. The Supreme Court in United States v. SCRAP26 rejected a "sig-
nificant interest" test in defining the federal law of standing.2 7 The Court
stated that such a test was "fundamentally misconceived" 2s and implied
that the source of the misconception lay in the fact that some persons
who had a direct stake in the outcome of a lawsuit would be excluded be-
cause their affected interest was not "significant" enough.29 Similarly, even
if the public interest litigant car/prove the existence of a direct interest,
he might still fail the test of party status under section 2-304(5) (d) for
lack of a "significant.... eiobugh interest. Such a public interest litigant will
therefore be precluded from obtaining standing under section 9-103.
If a land use issue before the local Agency involves significant external
costs, it may be reviewed by the State Land Adjudicatory Board. Section
9-10530 governs standing to appeal orders of the Board. The language of
25 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 468, in referring to subsection
five states:
Usually, that person is one who was qualified to become a party to the
administrative hearing but failed to do so or was denied permission by
the presiding hearing officer in keeping with § 2-304(5).
26412 U.S. 669 (1973).
27 Id. at 689:
The government urges us to limit standing to those who have been
"significantly" affected by agency action. But, even if we could begin to
define what such a test would mean, we think it fundamentally mis-
conceived. "Injury in fact" reflects the statutory requirement that a
person be "adversely affected" or "aggrieved," and it serves to dis-
tinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation-
even though small-from a person with a mere interest in the problem.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 The text of CODE, supra note 1, § 9-105 reads:
A proceeding to review an order or rule of the State Land Planning
Agency may be commenced only by
(1) an owner of land involved in the order or rule, or the applicant
for the development permit involved;
(2) an applicant requesting the acquisition of land for large-scale
development under Article 5, Part 2, and the owner of any parcel of
land within the site of the proposed development;
(3) any governmental agency;
(4) a person claiming that the order or rule deprives him or persons
he represents of rights given him by the constitution or laws of the
United States or of his state;
(5) any person satisfying the court that he has a significant interest
that has been affected by the order or rule.
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this section has been altered by the draftsmen. In the original Proposed
Official Draft, standing to appeal orders of the State Land Adjudicatory
Board was granted to specified persons. 31 The American Law Institute
has recently amended the language of this section in several significant
ways.3 2 The language of section 9-105 as it now reads represents a com-
promise born of a fierce debate over standing.3 3 It is clear that the section
was not intended to be a broad citizen suit provision.
34
The draftsmen also realized that, "An analogy can be drawn to the
development of standing in the federal courts. '35 The federal law of stand-
ing was largely ignored in the legislative scheme which was adopted, how-
ever. " 6 Finally, a plan to limit standing to certain specific and easily identi-
fiable classes of persons was considered and then modified by the use of
the "significant interest" terminology.
37
The three viewpoints represented in the standing debate are not syn-
thesized into a cohesive position by the draftsmen in the Official Notes
to the Code. The Notes merely discuss each point of view disjunctively
without ever demonstrating how the disjuncts ought to fit together.38 This
lack of guidance to legislatures and reviewing courts can only lead to
confusion in the adoption and application of the statutory language. Since
the draftsmen apparently could not agree upon a single position, they
should have written alternative versions of Article Nine with appropriate
commentary, or the dissenters should have published a minority report.
The present legislative confusion surrounding Article Nine only proves
the point that some significant amendments both to the Notes and to the
statutory language should be made before the Code is submitted to state
legislatures for adoption.
Public interest litigants will only be able to come within the ambit of
the section if they can meet the "significant interest" test of section 9-
31 Id.
3243 U.S.L.W. 2490 (May 27, 1975). At its May 1975 meeting the ALI made
the following changes in the standing provisions of section 9-105:
Section 9-105(3) now reads, any governmental agency "having a
significant interest" [in the action of the State Land Planning Agency].
Section 9-105(4) has been totally deleted.
Section 9-105(5) now reads, "any person who has a significant in-
terest affected by the order or rule." [This provision is now followed
by optional language which makes it clear that standing can be obtained
under other state laws.]
33 Id.
[T]he reporters intentionally did not use the term "aggrieved party"
nor did they adopt the broad citizen suit provision found in some state
environmental statutes authorizing "any person" to initiate suit. Sec-
tion 9-105 was intended to confine judicial review of actions of the state
planning agency ....
34 Id.
35 CODE, supra note I, § 9-103, Official Note, at 464.
36 See text accompanying note 46 infra, for a discussion of the possible effects
which the federal law of standing may have upon the Code.
37 See note 47 infra for an explanation of the most restrictive view of standing
held by some of the draftsmen.
38 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note.
Journal of Law Reform
105(5). This test poses precisely the same obstacles to standing as does
the "significant interest" test of sections 9-103(5) and 2-304(5). 3 9 A
more promising avenue to standing for the public interest litigant is through
other state statutes with broader standing provisions. 40 However, unless
such other state statutes exist, citizen plaintiffs will very likely find them-
selves denied the ability to challenge orders of the State Land Adjudicatory
Board.
Section 9-104 governs standing to appeal rules of the State Land Ad-
judicatory Board. An examination of this section reveals that the citizen
litigant must meet a more liberal test to challenge a rule than must be
met to contest orders arising out of administrative hearings. Section
9-104 specifically enumerates the persons with standing to seek judicial
relief from administrative rules. 4' Like 9-103 and 9-105, section 9-104
grants standing to the landowner, certain neighboring landowners, neigh-
borhood organizations, and governmental agencies.4 2 The public interest
litigant who does not come within one of these classes of persons must try
to satisfy the "significant interest" test of section 9-104(6), or the test of
section 9-104(5), which grants standing to
[A] person claiming that the ordinance or rule deprives him
or persons he represents of rights given him by the constitution
or the laws of the United States or of his State ....- I'
This provision is unique among the standing provisions of Article Nine.
It is apparent from the Notes to section 9-104 that the draftsmen
39 See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
40 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-105, Official Note, at 476 reads: "This section is not
intended to change the existing [state] law governing taxpayers' suits or other special-
ized remedies."
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1201
et seq. (Supp. 1976), which is considered at notes 108-16 and accompanying text
infra as a means of ameliorating the effects of Article Nine of the Code, is one such
state law allowing "any person" to maintain an action for the protection of the air,
water or other natural resource.
41 The full text of CODE, supra note 1, § 9-104 reads:
In the absence of an order, a proceeding to review a rule of the State
Land Reserve Agency or a rule or ordinance of a local government may
be commenced only by
(I) an owner of land subject to the rule or ordinance;
(2) an owner of land within [500] feet of any land subject to the rule
or ordinance;
(3) a neighborhood organization qualified under § 2-307 by the local
Land Development Agency if the boundaries of the organization include
any part of the land subject to the rule or ordinance, or any land within
[500] feet of any land subject to the rule or ordinance;
(4) any governmental agency other than an agency created solely
by the local government which adopted the ordinance or rule;
(5) a person claiming that the ordinance or rule deprives him or per-
sons he represents of rights given him by the constitution or laws of the
United States or of his State;
(6) any other person satisfying the court that he has a significant
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intended this language to have a special significance. The Notes expressly
state that standing to challenge rules is broader than standing to attack
orders. 44 The draftsmen then state that section 9-104(5) was intended to
give standing to nonresidents and nonlanded persons to challenge ex-
clusionary zoning practices. 45 The language of section 9-104(5) is highly
significant, since it incorporates federal and state constitutional rights.
Federal rights should also include the right to claim standing under fed-
eral standards, which are considerably more liberal than the "significant
interest" test of Article Nine.46 Thus, public interest litigants may be able
to challenge rules of the State Land Adjudicatory Board, provided that
they can meet federal standing requirements.
II. STANDING POLICY OF THE CODE
As noted above, the policy of Article Nine represents a compromise
on the standing issue.47 Because of the lack of consensus among the
draftsmen, the Article has no single coherent policy.
The entire Code is a model legislative act and is not intended to create
uniformity from state to state. 48 The draftsmen examined existing state
law for precedents on the standing question and found it to be riddled with
contradictions and splits of authority. 49 For example, when deciding the
crucial issue of whether to impose standing restrictions on those who
could not achieve party status, the draftsmen were faced with a split of
authority in the state laws.50 In reaching their policy choice, resort was
had to a minority rule, as exemplified by a line of Vermont cases. 51 This
minority rule requires a person to have party status at the hearing in order
to have standing to challenge an order.
Another policy choice is embodied in sections 9-103(3)(a) and 9-104(2),
which grant standing to the owner of land within 500 feet of the land
which is the subject of the controversy. The draftsmen acknowledged that
44 See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
45 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-104, Official Note, at 474:
Section 9-104(5) makes it easier for non-residents and non-landed per-
sons to challenge rules and ordinances that affect his rights under the
laws and constitution of the state or the United States. For example, if
a general development ordinance so restricts the development of land
that certain persons are excluded from the community, it is difficult
under existing standing rules for members of that class to secure
a determination of their claim .... Subsection (5) is designed to give a
person who does not reside on land in an area to challenge the onerous-
ness of the restriction.
46 See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
47 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
48 Fox, supra note 2, at 949.
49 See, e.g., CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 468.
50 Id.:
While most jurisdictions permit review by protestants without requiring
participation in prior administrative proceedings... a growing number
do require participation and status as a party to the proceedings to
have standing to commence judicial review. See, e.g., Wright v. Pre-
seault, 306 A.2d 673 (Vt. 1973) ....
51 Id. See part IV infra for a detailed examination of Preseault and its progeny.
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in some jurisdictions neighboring landowners are given standing if their
land is reasonably close to the land in question, either without
showing of specific injury, or by presuming aggrievement on no
facts other than the location of the petitioner's land.
52
This rule would be imposed upon states whose laws do not accord a neigh-
boring landowner any special status among persons seeking standing to
sue.
5 3
If the foregoing discussion demonstrates the difficulty of making choices
between conflicting policies, it also suggests that this model legislative act
will by its very existence create difficulties for some states. If a state which
does not otherwise require party status as a condition precedent to stand-
ing wishes to adopt the Code, it will have to reject section 2-304(5)(d)
and Article Nine, or at least amend them in some very significant ways.
It would be better if Article Nine imposed a uniform standing requirement
upon the states. Even the proponents of restrictive standing requirements
in the drafting committee found that by strictly enumerating those persons
entitled to sue, they could impose a desirable degree of certainty and uni-
formity upon the states adopting the Code.
54
A response to these conflicting policies is that uniformity in standing
is desirable, and that recourse should have been had to the federal law
of standing to provide a national standard. Indeed, this is the approach
that the draftsmen took when they dealt with exclusionary zoning prob-
lems in section 9-104(5).
55
III. THE FEDERAL LAW OF STANDING
The general philosophy of the Code in regard to standing is more re-
strictive than the federal law set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton,5 6 United
States v. SCRAP 57 and Warth v. Seldin.5s In those cases, the Supreme
Court required the plaintiffs to have a property interest or other personal
right at stake before they would be granted standing to litigate in the public
interest. This requirement puts "the decision as to whether review will
be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome." 59
In Sierra Club, the Supreme Court exhibited an antipathy toward granting
standing to those individuals or groups who had no affected property
interest or other personal right at stake because of an expressed fear that
52 CODE, supra note 1, § 9-103, Official Note, at 466.
53 Id. The draftsmen called the imposition of a rule according special status to
neighboring landowners a "compromise."
54 43 U.S.L.W. 2490 (May 27, 1975):
Professor Charles Alan Wright said that the effect of the proposed Sec-
tion 9-105(5) would be to force courts to spend time deciding who has
standing and who doesn't. The Code ought to decide what classes of
persons have standing and say so, according to Wright.
55 See notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra.
56 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
57 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
58 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
59 405 U.S. at 740.
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they "seek to do no more than vindicate their own value preferences
through the judicial process. '60 Sierra Club has been criticized, since the
dispute in that case involved long-range and permanent effects to the en-
vironment. It seems superfluous to have required the plaintiffs to have
personal rights at stake in the traditional sense. 61
If the organization is unable to find such a plaintiff, it proves
nothing about the merits or nature of the suit sought to be in-
stituted.
62
The standing requirements of Sierra Club were further explained by
the Court in SCRAP. In this latter case, the plaintiffs did allege injury
to a personal right, but the injury was very slight and the causal link be-
tween defendants' actions and the asserted harm was very tenuous. 63 The
Court said that there were two requirements for standing to sue under the
federal law. The first of these was that a personal right be affected.
6 4
However, the injury to this right can be very slight.6 5 The second require-
ment was that plaintiffs be able to demonstrate a causal link between the
alleged harm and the affected personal right. 66 The Court added the caveat
that "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic ex-
ercise in the conceivable.
67
The Warth case presented a different set of possible external costs,
since it involved a land use decision which was not claimed to have en-
vironmental impact. 65 At issue in Warth was a zoning ordinance alleged
60 Id.
61 Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King Decision, 13 NAT.
RES. J. 76, 88 (1973) states:
[Tihe issues to engage our serious attention are risks of long-term, large
scale, practically irreversible disruptions of ecosystems. By denying to
persons who wish to assert those issues the right to come into Court,
and granting standing only to one who has a stake in his own present
use and enjoyment, the Court reveals how little it appreciated the real
meaning of the test case it had before it.
62 Id. at 81.
63 The plaintiff's claim was based on the assertion that:
[Flailure to suspend the [railroad rate] surcharge would cause their
members "economic, recreational and aesthetic harm." Specifically,
they claimed that the rate structure would discourage the use of "re-
cyclable" materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that
compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by
encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering and other extractive
activities. The members of these environmental groups were allegedly
forced to pay more for finished products, and their use of forests and
streams was allegedly impaired because of unnecessary destruction of
timber and extraction of raw materials ....
412 U.S. at 675-76.
64 Id. at 687.
65 See id.
66 Id. at 688.
67 Id.
68 A decision made on the local level which imposes burdens on persons living
beyond the boundaries of the locality is said to have "external costs." On the other
hand, "[diecisions directly affecting the growth and development of a community
are best made by that community through its own political processes." Fox, supra
note 2, at 930.
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to have the effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income from
Penfield, New York.6 9 The plaintiffs fell into three groups. As to the first
of these groups, resident taxpayers of the neighboring city of Rochester,
the Court asserted that there was no standing because the plaintiffs were
attempting to assert the putative rights of third parties.70 The second cate-
gory of plaintiffs included nonprofit, public interest associations. Again,
the Court denied standing to the associations under the Sierra Club doctrine
that an association must allege injury in fact to one of its members.
71
The final group, consisting of nonresident low income persons, was refused
standing for failure to show a causal relationship between the zoning
ordinance and some personal injury.72 The Court stated that these peti-
tioners had failed to show that they were harmed personally.7 3 It is ap-
parent that the Warth Court was doing no more than applying the two-
fold standing test of Sierra Club and SCRAP to an exclusionary zoning
case.
The nonresident plantiffs might have satisfied the Court's standing re-
quirements by trying to obtain a rezoning amendment for a low income
housing project in Penfield.74 This action would have given them a per-
sonal stake in the issues which the Court required. 75 In any case, the
result of filing a rezoning application under the Code would be to give
the plaintiffs party status under section 2-304(5)(a), and hence provide
them with a statutory right to appeal any order of the local Land De-
69 422 U.S. at 495. See also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3473 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976).
70 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975):
[T]he only basis of the taxpayer-petitioners' claim is that Penfield's
zoning ordinance and practices violate the constitutional and statutory
rights of third parties, namely, persons of low and moderate income
who are said to be excluded from Penfield. In short the claim of these
petitioners falls squarely within the prudential standing rule that nor-
mally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others
in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves.
71 Id. at 511; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972).
72422 U.S. at 506-07: "In short, the facts alleged fail to support an actionable
causal relationship between Penfield's zoning practices and petitioners' asserted
injury."
73 Id. at 508:
We hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning
practices must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the
challenged practices harm hin, and that he personally would benefit
in a tangible way from the courts' intervention.
74 id. at 504:
Petitioners must allege facts from which it reasonably could be in-
ferred that, absent the respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there
is a substantial probability that they would have been able to purchase
or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords the relief requested,
the asserted inability of petitioners will be removed.
An attempt to obtain a rezoning amendment, coupled with such "substantial proba-
bility" of purchase or lease thus may suffice for standing. However, it can be argued
that more restrictive qualifications, such as the ability to carry through with the
proposed development or an option on land to be developed, would be necessary.
75 Id. at 508.
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velopment Agency under section 9-103 (1) (a), (2).76 Since it would have
been relatively easy for the plaintiffs to have made an unsuccessful at-
tempt to obtain a rezoning amendment, the requirement that there
be a personal right affected would appear to be a small burden, which
would provide the judiciary with the assurance that the petitioners would
be vitally interested in the issues and would prosecute the case vigorously.
Thus, if Article Nine of the Code expressly adopted the federal law of
standing as a uniform requirement, public interest litigants would not have
to meet a large burden to obtain access to the courts.
The standing problems posed by Warth are very likely to arise again
before state supreme courts where the Code has been adopted. Under
the present legislative scheme, the state courts are not constrained to resolve
the standing issue in the same way as the Supreme Court. However, it
is to be hoped that the express language of the Code, especially section 9-
103, will impel state courts to impose a Warth standing rule where zoning
rather than environmental issues are involved. Some commentators have
argued that since environmental cases involve a different set of factual
issues, standing in such cases should be unlimited.7 7 They argue that en-
vironmental issues affect the rights of every member of society, and it
follows that anyone should be able to assert those rights in the courts. 78
IV. DIVERGENT STATE STANDING REQUIREMENTS UNDER
ARTICLE NINE
Only Florida 79 and Vermont 0 have adopted land use statutes modeled
upon prior tentative drafts of the Code. The Florida Environmental Land
and Water Management Act of 1972, which is modeled on Tentative Draft
Number Three of the Code, allows only the owner, the developer, gov-
ernmental agencies, or "materially affected parties" to appeal from a
development order of a local government to the state Land and Water
Adjudicatory Commission.8 ' The "materially affected" test seems to be a
76 See note 45 and accompanying text supra. It is clear that under section 9-104 if
petitioners had wished to challenge a rule made before the state Land Planning
Agency, they could have done so without attempting to obtain a development per-
mit. However, in cases like Warth, no significant statewide concern may be in-
volved, and plaintiffs must then concern themselves with the problem of gaining
standing to appeal decisions of the local board.
77 In an empirical study, Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act
of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004 (1972), the authors conclude
that suits brought under the standing provision of the Michigan Environmental Pro-
tection Act, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1976), providing
standing to "any person" in environmental matters, had not generally been frivolous
but were brought primarily in cases involving issues of great significance.
78 See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra; Sax, supra note 61, at 88.
79 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.012 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
80VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
81 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.07 (Supp. 1974) reads in part:
(1) There is hereby created the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory
Commission, which shall consist of the Administration Commission.
(2) Whenever any local government issues any development order in
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variant of the "significant interest" test of section 2-304(5)(d). s 2 It is likely
that a potential plaintiff will have to show more than slight harm to his
interests in order to demonstrate a "material" effect. It also appears that
the Florida statute adheres closely to the Code's requirement that ap-
pellants have a personally affected right at stake in the action. However,
there have been no cases decided under the statute, and how it will be
read is uncertain.
The Vermont statute,8 3 also modeled on the Code, has generated some
litigation. Under the Vermont scheme, only parties to proceedings, which
include only the landowner, the regional and municipal planning com-
missions, and municipalities, may appeal the decision of the district
commission to the state Environmental Board. 84 Significantly, there is
no language which would allow "any person" or a "person aggrieved" to
come before the district commission or to appeal to the state Environmental
Board.8 5 Cases appealed to the Environmental Board may be removed to
the appropriate county court, but removal may be had only by the ap-
plicant for the development permit.86 In any case, issues before either the
court or the Environmental Board may be raised only by parties. 87 The final
any area of critical state concern, or in regard to any development of
regional impact, a copy of such order shall be transmitted to the state
land planning agency and the owner or developer of the property
affected by such order. Within thirty days after the order is rendered,
either the owner, developer, an appropriate regional planning agency,
or the state land planning agency may appeal the order to the Florida
land and water adjudicatory commission by filing a notice of appeal
with the commission .... Upon motion and good cause shown the
Florida land and water adjudicatory commission may permit materially
affected parties to intervene in the appeal ....
82 See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
83 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975).
84 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6085(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
Parties shall be those who have received notice, adjoining property
owners who have requested a hearing and such other persons as the
board may allow by rule. For the purposes of appeal only the appli-
cant, a state agency, the regional and municipal planning commissions
and the municipalities required to receive notice shall be considered
parties. An adjoining property owner may participate in hearings and
present evidence only to the extent the proposed development or sub-
division will have a direct effect on his property under section
6086(a)(1) through (a)(10) of this title. (emphasis added).
The "municipalities required to receive notice" which are allowed to appeal under
section 6085(c) are specifically described in VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6084(a) (1973)
as:
[A] municipality, and municipal and regional planning commissions
wherein the land is located, and any adjacent Vermont municipality,
municipal or regional planning commission if the land is located on a
boundary.
85 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6085(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
86 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975) states in relevant part:
An appeal from the district commission shall be to the board. An
appeal under this section may be removed by the applicant to the
county court of the county in which any real estate of the applicant in-
volved in the application is located ....
87 Id.
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stage of the appeals process, from either the county seat or the Environ-
mental Board to the state supreme court, is available solely to persons
with party status before the district commission."8 Vermont courts have
been reluctant to grant standing to any person not falling within some
express provision of the statute.8 9 These courts have considered several of
the arguments proposed for circumventing potentially restrictive standing
provisions, and have either rejected or modified the arguments to such a
degree that public interest plaintiffs will be unable to establish standing. 90
The Vermont Supreme Court was initially willing to supplement the
Vermont Land Development Code with the state's Administrative Proce-
dure Act, which gives any person "aggrieved" by an administrative action
recourse to the courts. 9' In re Preseault92 involved a dispute between the
developer of a seventy-six unit apartment complex and the adjacent prop-
erty owners. A development permit was denied before the district commis-
sion, and the developer took an appeal to the Environmental Board, which
granted a permit.93 The objecting adjoining property owners were not al-
lowed to appear as parties before the Environmental Board.9 4 An appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court of Vermont, which held that "the intent of the
legislature... is to accord to adjoining property owners the right to appear
as parties at hearings before the Environmental Board."9' 5 In order to
reach this result, the court read the state APA in pari materia with the
judicial review provision of the Vermont Land Development Code and
determined that the adjoining property owners were "aggrieved persons." 96
The court acknowledged that the restrictive judicial review provisions
would work too harsh a result if not mitigated by the APA.9 However,
the persons seeking review in this case were adjoining landowners whom
the Vermont Land Development Code allows to participate in hearings. 98
The real source of their difficulties stemmed from the fact that they had
been omitted as parties in the proceedings before the district commission.
The opinion does not make it clear precisely why the landowners were
88 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6089(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975) provides:
An appeal from a decision of the board or county court under sub-
section (a) shall be to the supreme court by a party as set forth in
section 6085(c) of this title.
For a description of parties under section 6085(c), see note 76 supra.
89 See In re Great Eastern Building Co., 132 Vt. 610, 326 A.2d 152 (1974); In re
Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972).
90In re Great Eastern Building Co., 132 Vt. 610, 326 A.2d 152 (1974); In re
Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972).
91.VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 815(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
92 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d 832 (1972). The Preseault case generated a plethora of
subsequent litigation between various parties. See In re Application of Preseault,
132 Vt. 471, 321 A.2d 65 (1974); Preseault v. Wheel, 132 Vt. 247, 315 A.2d 244
(1974); Wright v. Preseault, 131 Vt. 403, 306 A.2d 673 (1973).
93 The full facts of the litigation are set out in In re Application of Preseault, 132
Vt. 471, 473, 321 A.2d 65, 66 (1974).
9 4 Id.
95 130 Vt. at 348-49, 292 A.2d at 836.
96 Id. at 347, 292 A.2d at 834-35.
97 Id. at 348, 292 A.2d at 835.
98 See note 76 supra.
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omitted at this stage of the litigation. Preseault, therefore, was distinguish-
able on its facts, and was not subsequently read for the broader proposition
that the public interest litigant, who, unlike an adjoining landowner,
has no statutory basis for participating in the decisionmaking process,
will be granted standing to appeal.
Preseault was cut back considerably by In re Great Eastern Building
Co.,99 where the parties attempting to gain standing were homeowners
living a quarter mile down the road from a proposed development of con-
dominiums. They asserted injury based on the traffic congestion and
unsafe highway conditions which the development would cause, but the
Environmental Board denied them party status at the hearing for the
development permit. 100 In holding that the neighboring landowners could
not intervene on appeal, the court said again that the state APA should
be read in pari materia with the Vermont Code.' 0 ' However, the court went
on to restrict the in pari materia doctrine by adding that the appellants
could not appeal unless they had attained party status under one of the
specific classes of the Land Development Code, or unless they could
show injury to some legally protected right. 10 2 It then concluded that
the prevention of increased traffic flow was not a matter in which an in-
dividual has a legally protected personal right. Therefore, if the public
interest litigant can not come within a classification of the Vermont Land
Development Code, and can not show that some personal right is affected,
the in pari materia argument will not meet with success in Vermont.
The Great Eastern court was also presented with the argument that
those who can intervene as of right have standing to appeal. 10 3 The court
never addressed the issue, however, since it decided that the appellants
had no underlying right of intervention. 10 4 The appellants did not come
under a class enumerated in the Vermont Land Development Code, which
would have accorded them party status, nor did they come under any of
the administratively formulated rules expanding party status beyond the
99 132 Vt. 610, 326 A.2d 152 (1974).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 613, 326 A.2d at 153-54.
1O2ld. at 612-13, 326 A.2d at 153-54:
The appellants also argue that 10 V.S.A. § 6085 and 3 V.S.A. § 801
should be read in pari materia. In re Preseault, 130 Vt. 343, 292 A.2d
832 (1972). While In re Preseault, supra, establishes that these statutes
should be construed with reference to each other as parts of one system,
it does not convey an automatic right of participation to those not ad-
mitted as parties on the threshold level. The joining of Act 250 with the
Administrative Procedure Act fails to enlarge those categories of
persons entitled to party status as of right .... The appellants are not
entitled as of right to party status under 10 V.S.A. § 6085(c). Party
status is acquired by those who have received notice, by adjoining
property owners who have requested a hearing and by those who are
admitted in the discretion of the agency. Since the appellants do not
qualify as members of these categories, allegations of harm do not
constitute injury absent a legally protected right.
103 ld. at 614, 326 A.2d at 154.
104 Id.
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narrow statutory definition. 10 5 The court decided that there was no right
to intervene in the absence of an express statutory grant or an administra-
tive rule. 10 6 Therefore, if a court, like that of Vermont, is inclined to
accept the proposition that standing to appeal is inextricably bound up
with intervention as of right, it is also likely to find that the public interest
litigant who can invoke no statutory right of intervention has met an in-
surmountable barrier. The courts seem comfortable with restrictive inter-
vention as of right because the interests of the intervenor are adequately
represented by parties already present at the hearings.1
0 7
Vermont thus provides an example of the very restrictive law of standing
which Article Nine is capable of producing in the hands of some state
courts. The federal law of standing has been completely ignored in Ver-
mont, and the concept of party status has been restricted to a needless
degree. A valuable point of view, in the form of the public interest litigant,
has been excluded from land use litigation in Vermont through the mechan-
ical application of overly narrow rules. A uniform law of standing based
upon the present federal standards would be preferable to standing laws such
as those in Vermont.
In other states, however, restrictive judicial review provisions may be
circumvented by gaining standing under some other state statute. Mich-
igan has not adopted the Code, but should it ever do so it is likely that
the liberal standing provisions of the Michigan Environmental Protection
Act (MEPA) l0 s would provide a significant right of standing in land use
cases. The relevant section of MEPA provides that "any person" may main-
tain an action in the state courts "for the protection of the air, water and
other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, im-
pairment or destruction.' 1 9 The legislative history of MEPA reveals that
the act was intended to allow suits by private citizens in the public interest,
so long as it could be demonstrated that an issue of environmental sig-
nificance was at stake. 110 A showing of an affected right, therefore, is not
necessary to gain standing to sue under MEPA.
105 Id. at 612, 326 A.2d at 153.
1
06 Id. at 614, 326 A.2d at 154:
The appellants' third argument rests on a right of intervention in an
administrative proceeding. This contention is buttressed by no statutory
support; consequently, any claim of right to intervention is unfounded.
107 The Great Eastern court, 132 Vt. at 614, 326 A.2d at 154, assumed that the
municipality and the planning commissions which had been accorded party status
adequately represented the interests of the neighboring landowners.
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Wayne County Dep't of Health v. Chrysler
Corp., 43 Mich. App. 235, 236, 203 N.W.2d 912, 913 (1972) decided that under the
terms of Michigan General Court Rule 1963, R. 209.1(3), the intervenor had to show
affirmatively that his interest was not represented by the existing parties.
108 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1201 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
109 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1976).
110 In Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Pro-
gress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1004, 1073 n.283 (1972), Professor Sax, MEPA's
chief draftsman, stated:
The legislative history of the EPA is clear that the Act was ex-
plicitly intended to allow suits by private citizens against regulatory
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The Michigan Supreme Court has shown a willingness to read MEPA
in pari materia with other state statutes."' In Highway Commission v.
Vanderkloot,1 12 the Michigan State Highway Commission sought to con-
demn eleven acres of defendant's land for the widening and improvement
of U.S. Highway 24. The condemned land was a swamp, and the de-
fendant argued that the Highway Commission had not taken the ecological
consequences of its proposed action into account. 1 13 The court decided
that MEPA must be read in pari materia with the Highway Condemnation
Act, and that the Highway Commission had to make findings on matters
of environmental significance in its condemnation proceedings.
114
It seems likely that the Michigan courts will require that MEPA also be
read in pari materia with the Model Land Development Code if it should
be adopted by the Michigan Legislature. This approach would give public
interest litigants access to the courts in land use issues which would im-
pose external costs upon the environment. MEPA will not be a panacea
for public interest plaintiffs, however, since certain important land use
issues, like exclusionary zoning, often do not involve environmental mat-
ters. In addition, only a minority of states have any environmental pro-
tection statutes." 5 MEPA was passed pursuant to an express command
of the Michigan constitution," 6 and other states without such constitutional
mandates may not feel the need to pass environmental statutes in the
future.
agencies to require them to fulfill their legal obligations to prosecute
polluters, and to treat their failure to do so as a violation of section 3 of
the Act.
111At least one lower court in Michigan has exhibited a similar willingness to
apply the in pari materia doctrine to MEPA. See Payant v. Department of Natural Re-
sources (Cir. Ct. Dickinson Co., Mich. 1971), where the court granted plaintiffs
standing under MEPA to challenge a Department of Natural Resources rulemaking
proceeding concerning the hunting of antlerless deer.
112 392 Mich. 159, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 182, 220 N.W.2d at 426-27:
Legislation need not specifically refer to other legislation it affects to
be read in pari materia .... The Legislature is only enjoined [by MICH.
CONST. art. 4, § 521 to enact legislation protecting natural resources
from pollution, impairment and destruction. The responsive action
of the Legislature can be in specific provisions in pertinent enactments
or in the form of generally applicable legislation; in fact the Legislature
has acted in general legislation [MEPA]. Such legislation must be
read in concert with the Highway Condemnation Act.
115 1 CCH POLLUTION CONTROL GUIDE 5430 (1974). There are only twenty-one
states which currently require the filing of environmental impact statements. They
are: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
116 MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52:
The conservation and development of the natural resources of the
state are hereby declared to be of paramount public concern in the
interest of the health, safety and general welfare of the people. The
legislature shall provide for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment and de-
struction.
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V. CONCLUSION
The best approach for Article Nine to adopt would be a uniform stand-
ing provision, preferably based unequivocally upon the federal standards.
In its present form, the language of Article Nine can be read to achieve
results similar to Great Eastern, or to impose a Warth rule, or even to grant
standing to "any person" under certain environmental laws. It is un-
fortunate that the standing provisions of the Code are based upon a com-
promise, because this situation has created uncertainty and has allowed for
arbitrary results in the application of Article Nine.
-Richard L. Epling
